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This study evaluates the impact of provision of credit guarantee in Korea at the firm level. 
The data is assembled from two public funds providing credit guarantees covering the period 
2000 to 2003. The sample firms consist of SMEs mainly. To measure the effects of credit 
guarantee, the relationship between credit guarantees, survival of firms, and their productive 
performance is analyzed. Since the data is collected as repeated cross sections and firms are not 
identified over time, the analysis is carried out by using a pseudo panel data approach. The 
pseudo panel data is created using time invariant firm characteristics. The result from regression 
analysis conducted indicates that the amounts of credit guarantee and the number of times a firm 
receives credit guarantees have effects on their survival and growth. The amounts of credit 
guarantee increase the growth of sales and productivity while frequency of credit guarantees 
decreases business failure. Size and age play a decisive role in survival of firms and their 
employment growth as well. Moreover, survival and performance of firms are different across 
periods, industries, and locations.   
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  11. INTRODUCTION 
 
For policy makers and academic researchers, the survival and growth of Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises (SMEs) is a matter of primary concern. The dynamic disposition of SMEs is 
an interesting topic in that they invigorate the stagnant economy and are necessary as an 
infrastructure for large corporations. Generally, SMEs are so flexible in organization and 
production structure that they can seize new business opportunities quickly and overcome 
financial crisis at a lower cost. In addition, SMEs contribute to the stability of society by 
accounting for a large share of total employment. 
However, SMEs in common face great difficulties to finance investment due to asymmetric 
information. The asymmetry in information arises from lack of financial information and 
standardized financial statements. That is the reason why government intervenes to establish 
and to enhance collaboration between financial institutes and SMEs through credit guarantee 
systems in many countries. If credit guarantee institutions are able to inform about the risks 
associated with the loans of the lenders properly or they manage the risk better than lenders, 
then credit guarantees can help to overcome SMEs collateral constraints. It will relieve the risks 
of lending to SMEs and micro enterprises, it compensates for low profit margins, and it 
produces additionality
1  (Gudger, 1998). Riding and Haines (2001) indicated that loan guarantee 
programs could be an effective mean of supporting the start-up, growth, and survival of new and 
risky enterprises. In other words, credit guarantee warrants firms to private investors and settle 
informational asymmetries that might have otherwise precluded investments. 
Korean government encouraged new businesses and support to SMEs to accelerate 
economic growth and to decrease unemployment rate in the aftermath of the economic crisis in 
late 1990’s. Among many direct and indirect support measures, credit guarantee system is seen 
as one of the most important instruments to achieve the economic policy goals. The credit 
guarantee system played an important role in assisting SMEs to raise necessary investment 
funds from the capital market throughout the economic crisis in the late 1990’s and in particular 
after the collapse of bubble in venture business in early 2000’s. Since banks were reluctant to 
lend to SMEs in the absence of exact risk measures, the amount of credit guarantee increased 
rapidly as a corrective measure. This was due to their inherent high risk such as high failure rate 
and lack of collateral, especially for venture business or new technology based firms. With 
credit guarantee, many SMEs overcame financial distress and achieved their transformation into 
                                            
1 According to Gudger (1998), additionality means that “a small investment in a guarantee institution’s capital 
and/or on-going administrative support to guarantee institutions can produce a significantly larger volume of lending 
to a credit constrained sector than would have been achieved without such guarantees”. 
  2a competitive constitution. However, it has been criticized that credit guarantee by being 
favorable to SMEs instigates moral hazard and procrastinates withdrawal of inefficient firms, 
disturbing the market mechanism as a result. 
In spite of its economic and social impacts, evaluation of the performance of credit 
guarantee, for reasons of lack of data and data confidentiality, has not been a popular research 
topic in Korea. Few researches investigated its impacts on the economy, for example, with inter-
industry analysis (Hong, Park, and Jeon, 2003) and with modified national income distributed 
model (Lim, Park, and Han, 2003). However, the outcome of credit guarantee has not been 
evaluated at the firm level but only from a limited macroscopic viewpoint in those researches. 
Recently Kim (2004) based on aggregate data from small and medium business administration 
(SMBA) and D&B Korea indicated that the relation between policy loan
2 and performance of 
SMEs is statistically insignificant in general.     
This paper evaluates the impact of provision of credit guarantee at the firm level. To 
estimate the effects of credit guarantee, the analysis of effects between credit guarantee, survival 
and growth of SMEs, and their productive performance is carried out using a pseudo panel data 
of Korean SMEs. The sample firms have requested credit guarantee from one or both of the 
public credit guarantee funds. 
This study is distinguished from the existing literature by the following features. First, it is 
based on a large data set that is unique in that information of debtors is used. Second, the data is 
obtained from two different credit guarantee funds enabling evaluation and comparison of their 
performance in achieving their goals. Third, the impact of credit guarantees on survival and 
growth of firms is measured with respect to sales growth, labor productivity, and employment 
growth. Fourth, the results shed lights on policy of credit guarantee supply which might be 
biased by type of firm, firm size, location of firm, and industrial sector which firm belongs to. 
Fifth, as a new approach in the view of debtors, this research is useful in identifying the strength 
and weaknesses of the past and present policies as well as issues to take into account in 
designing new policy programs. Finally, at the absence of micro data and empirical result, this 
study is an added value to the literature on credit guarantees and covering a critical period in a 
newly industrialized economy’s development.       
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews researches about 
survival and growth of SMEs. Moreover, the credit guarantee system, for the purpose of 
supporting SMEs, is particularly looked through. The current state of SMEs and credit 
guarantee system in Korea are presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the original data and 
                                            
2 Policy loan  includes not only credit guarantees but also other all funds provided by government or public 
institutions.  
  3presents the constructed pseudo panel data. The way how the pseudo panel is constructed is 
explained and discrepancy between the original data and pseudo data is compared. In section 5, 
firm survival and performance models are developed for analysis. Section 6 reports and 
discusses empirical finding. Finally, based on results, we propose a number of improvements in 
the policy of SMEs finances and discuss the limitations of the current study, and suggest 
guidelines for the direction of future research in this area. 
 
2. THEORETICAL  DEVELOPMENT 
 
The literature investigating the survival and performance of SMEs has developed in 
different ways. First of all, many researchers focused on endogenous features of firms. 
Jovanovic (1982) proposed the theory of noisy selection asserting that the growth and survival 
of firms are linked to the size, age and initial production efficiency implying that younger and 
smaller firms tend to grow faster than older and larger firms. Audretsch (1991) indicated that the 
probability of plant exit decreases with the initial size but, on the other hand, the post-entry 
growth is negatively related to initial size (Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995). Mata, Portugal and 
Guimaraes (1995) revealed that size of an enterprise is an important determinant of the chances 
of firm survival in Portugal. Using the panel of publicly traded US firms, Dhawan (2001) 
indicated that small firms are significantly not only more productive but also riskier than their 
large counterparts. Many empirical researches presented results suggesting that survival rate 
decreases dramatically with the elapse of time (Audretsch, 1991; Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 
1995; Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 1999; Lee, 2003).   
Second, interest and concern is extended into exogenous factors. In addition to the basic 
analysis of individual factors, researchers consider various factors such as location (Stearns, 
Carter, Reynolds and Williams, 1995), scale economies (Audretsch, 1991), innovation 
(Audretsch, 1991 and 1995), technology (Agarwal, 1996; Kiyota and Okazaki, 2005), entrance 
time (Honjo, 2000), and R&D (Wilbon, 2002), labor market and regional support (Heshmati, 
2001). Audretch (1995, 1999) revealed that survival rate varies by manufacturing industries. 
Analysis across countries as well as industries is conducted for Portugal (Mata, Portugal and 
Guimaraes, 1995), for Turkey (Taymaz, 1997), for Italy (Audretsch, Santarelli and Vivarelli, 
1999), for Sweden (Heshmati, 2001), for Japan (Honjo, 2000), for Korea (Lee, 2003), and for 
OECD countries (Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 2003). Appendix 1 summarizes 
selections of previous researches on firm dynamics with respect to the countries, periods, 
methods used, and conclusions drawn. 
  4In addition to Lee (2003), Hong et al. (2003) showed empirically evidence of employment-
inducing effect of credit guarantee in input-output analysis with KCGF data.
3 It is estimated 
that 1% increase in credit guarantee decreases 0.24% of unemployment by using Okun’s 
equation
4. However, credit guarantees given before the 1997 crisis had no positive effects on 
employment. In other word, credit guarantee in past did not have any effects on employment, 
while credit guarantee provided after the crisis decreased unemployment rate through growth in 
production. Consequently, it is highly probable that excessive provision of credit guarantee 
causes negative side effects in an economy such as inefficient allocation of scare financial 
resources in the long run. In might also affect the level and timing of investment in a non-
optimal or even negative way. 
 
3.  THE STATUS OF SMES AND CREDIT GUARANTEE SYSTEM IN KOREA 
3.1.  The status of micro and SMEs in Korea 
 
In Korea, the firms are in general classified into small, medium, and large enterprises 
depending on the number of regular employees and the size of paid-in-capital or sales volume. 
The two classification measures in above differ by industrial sector. Appendix 2 shows the 
definition of SMEs used in more detail. SMEs hold a great majority of stock of firms in Korea. 
The number of micro and SMEs equals about 2.95 million, comprising 86,000 medium 
enterprises and 2.86 million small enterprises in 2002 (Appendix 3). With the exception of 
business activity and education sector, small firms account for more than 95% of total number 
of enterprises in each sector. This is 99.8% of population of enterprises
5. In terms of 
employment, SMEs play an important role as well. Of the total employees 86.7% worked in 
SMEs in 2002 (Appendix 4). The number of employees by large enterprises dropped by 1.25 
million while that of SMEs increased by 2.13 million during the post economic crisis period 
from late 1997 to 2002.   
Despite its volume, SMEs’ exports are smaller and it grew slower than that of LSEs 
(Appendix Figure 1). In the aftermath of economic crisis, despite the growing number of SMEs, 
the amount of SMEs’ exports dropped while the corresponding for LSEs increased somewhat. 
                                            
3 Hong et al. (2003) indicated that only indirect effect is considered in input-output analysis, which might 
underestimate the outcomes. On the other side, fixed prices enable to overestimate the effects.   
4  ) ( / ) ( n t f n t U U Y Y Y − = − α , where Y  is actual real GDP, Y  is potential real GDP, U  is potential 
unemployment rate, and    is the actual unemployment rate. 
t n n
t U
5  As a matter of fact, Micro enterprises constitute about 92% of SMEs and 89% of all enterprises. 
  5The slow export growth might be due to revaluation of Korean currency. SMEs are more 
vulnerable to volatility in foreign currency exchange rates than LSEs. In 2001, the portion of 
SMEs peaked; however, it was due to depression of LSEs’ exports rather than growth of SMEs’ 
exports.
6 
Performance of SMEs was not worse than that of LSEs during the depression period as a 
result of foreign exchange deficiency. Net income margin of SMEs was positive except in 1998 
while that of LSEs was negative between 1998 and 2001 (Appendix 5). Oh, Heshmati, Baek and 
Lee (2005) showed that output weighted TFP level was higher in SMEs than in LSEs between 
1996 and 2001 in manufacturing sector (Appendix Figure 2). However, operating income 
margin and R&D expenditures over sales have been higher in LSEs since 1998 and output 
weighted growth rate as well since 1999 (Appendix 5, Figure 3). Even though debt to equity 
ratio reduced in both SMEs and LSEs, the growth rate of interest coverage ratio was higher for 
LSEs than for SMEs recently. These differences are attributed to the fact that LSEs recovered 
their competitive power by succeeding in restructuring while SMEs lost their competitiveness 
and suffered from shortage of sources to finance investment. SMEs have been facing difficulties 
in financing investment in general following the economic crisis. Far from investment for future, 
SMEs are afflicted with financing working capital since there are limited sources of funds 
available to SMEs except for guaranteed loans from banks.     
There is no specific change in demographic structures of SMEs in manufacturing sector. 
Between 1998 and 2003, the average age did not change significantly over time. This means 
that firms’ turnover rate is almost constant. 
 
3.2.  The credit guarantee system and its development in Korea 
 
Credit guarantee system was first introduced in 1961 in Korea for the purpose of alleviation 
of the financial difficulties of SMEs. Nowadays, there are two public credit guarantee funds, 
Korea Credit Guarantee fund (KCGF)
7 and Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund 
(KOTEC)
8  in Korea. They were founded to achieve different policy goals. However, the goal of 
                                            
6 The main factor causing declines in LSEs’ exports was depression in electric and electronic products machinery.  
Exports of semi-conductor decreased from $26.01 billion to $14.26 billion. 
7 KCGF is a pubic financial institution established in 1976 under the provision of the Korea Credit Guarantee Fund 
Act. The objective of KCGF is to lead the balanced development of the national economy by extending credit 
guarantee services for the liabilities of promising enterprises which lack tangible collateral and stimulating sound 
credit transactions through the efficient management and use of the credit information. 
8 KOTEC was founded in 1989 under the Financial Assistance to New Technology Businesses Act which went 
through a full-scale revision and was newly titled Korea Technology Credit Guarantee Fund Act in 2002. The mission 
of KOTEC is to contribute to the national economy by providing credit guarantees to facilitate financing for new 
  6KOTEC was not executed thoroughly although it was established by the necessity to foster 
technology-based firms and to promote technological innovation. The amount of guarantee 
provided based on technology evaluation has in practice been less than 10% of total amount of 
guarantee until 2003 (Appendix 6).   
Even though both credit guarantee institutions are established to support SMEs, they have 
guaranteed relatively small LSEs, especially during economic crisis, as well. Therefore, it is 
possible to compare the effects of credit guarantees on SMEs with those given to LSEs. This 
enables to evaluate the outcome of economic policy in allocation of resources. 
In 1998, Korean SMEs were severely shocked at economic crisis caused by deficiency of 
foreign currency. Interest rates soared continuously and many enterprises went bankrupt. 
Consequently, as a measure to support SMEs who suffered heavily from lack of finance, the 
amount of credit guarantee increased as well. The balance of guarantee came up to 49.4 trillion 
won
9, or 6.1% of GDP, in 2003 as seen in Appendix 7. 
Capital funds for credit guarantee services consist mainly of contributions from the 
government and financial institutions.
10 High subrogation rate and replenishment (default 
where government compensate banks and financial institutes for their losses) from government 
is disputable (Appendix 8). From a view of opponents, excessive guarantees hinder growth of 
the financial market causing inefficiency in resource allocation and negative effects in the long 
term.  
Moreover, there are innate factors to provoke moral hazard in the present guarantee system. 
Since present guarantee rate is too high, 85%, exceeding the international standard, 60-70%, the 
high rate result in that lenders do not have incentive to investigate thoroughly. For example, 
banks paid 652.5 billion won while they received 3,141.7 billion won in 2004. Consequently, 
banks receive more subrogation than they contribute. 
 
4. DATA  DESCRIPTION 
4.1.  The genuine data 
 
The original data consist of 200,702 firms which requested credit guarantees from one or 
both of two credit guarantee funds, KCGF and KOTEC, during the period 2000 to 2004. All 
                                                                                                                                
technology-based enterprises while promoting the growth of technologically advanced SMEs and venture businesses. 
9  Averagely US $1 = 1042 won in 2005.   
10 While the contributions from financial institutions have a fixed ratio, 0.2% per annum of the loans for KCGF and 
0.1% of the average balance of the SME loans for KOTEC, the contributions from government is changing with the 
annual budget of the government. 
  7applicants provide basic information as well as financial data of previous years. However, 
guarantee funds do not require all detailed information in relation with applications for 
guarantees since determination of acceptance to provide credit guarantee proceeds in a number 
of steps. The data set include information only on accepted applications rather than on all 
applicants, but it contains all information gathered during the process of applications. However, 
all information necessary to identify firms and to trace them over time is not provided for 
confidentiality reason. Since observations are not independent over time, therefore, a pseudo 
panel data analysis applies appropriately compared with panel data analysis based on the 
original data. 
 
4.2.  Construction of the pseudo panel data 
 
Heshmati and Kumbhakar (1997) summarized the advantage of pseudo panels over genuine 
panels. First, conspicuous decrease in the number of observations relives intricate data 
management and laborious computational problems associated with large micro data sets. 
Second, the pseudo panel deals with attrition problem flexibly compared with original panels. 
Third, pseudo panel is an optimal solution to a case when repeated cross sections are available. 
In such cases the cross sections have no identity numbers to trace individual firms over time. 
Fourth, it is possible to solve confidentiality problem at firm level by using grouped cohorts 
instead of individual observations. Even though every observation is assembled into separated 
cohorts, each of the cohort means is well defined by key time invariant firm characteristics. The 
use of such characteristics has the advantage that firms are classified in the same cohorts over 
time. This property allows studying of the dynamics of firms in credit guarantee system. Fifth, 
researchers can prolong the time period by using repeated cross section data or rotating short 
period panel data. It allows for exit and entry but yet maintain the balanced nature of the panel 
data over time. Sixth, since cohort means are used as observations, missing units does not cause 
unbalance in the pseudo panel data. Finally, the prolonged time periods to some extent are 
indispensable for testing the constancy of parameter estimates over time, the dynamics of the 
system, and its impacts.   
The way to transform original data into pseudo panel is as follows. At the absent of an 
identity number to trace individual firms and to account for dependency of observations over 
time, a synthetic identity number is generated using firm characteristics that are likely constant 
over time. To account for properties of firms in the creation of cohorts, key time invariant 
characteristic factors constitute the new identification or cohort number as follows: 
  8 
(1)   IDNR=10000×CGI + 1000×SIZE + 10×KSIC + LOCATION 
11   
 
For example, an IDNR of 23451 indicates that the firm applied for credit guarantee to fund 
number 2, and the firm is of size 2, belongs to industrial sector 45 and is located in location 1. 
Thus, with the new identification number, one can easily estimate the basic information on the 
objects such as size, geographic location, industrial sector or other firm characteristics. The 
combined characteristics are used to generate a number of cells serving as individuals. Through 
the process of generation of the new identification, each cross-sectional data set is transformed 
into pseudo panel. In each of the two genuine and pseudo cases, the distributions of firms are 
shown in Appendix 9 to Appendix 12.   
Since each cohort generated in terms of new identification number contains different cell 
size or cohort size, remarkable discrepancy between original and pseudo data may be observed 
when looking at the distribution of firms by individual observations or cohorts. For example, 
frequency share of small-sized firms shrinks while that of medium-sized and large-sized 
counterpart increases due to inclusion of size into identification number. Similar tendencies are 
discovered in other firm characteristics cases such as industrial sector shown in Appendix 11 
and firm location shown in Appendix 12.   
In order to account for cohort size differences and to solve the discrepancy in the 
distribution of the data, the square root of the number of observations is multiplied by each cell 
mean variable as a weighting factor. Then, all financial data values are transformed into 
logarithmic form. Through this procedure, the large original data set is reduced to only 4,014 
cohorts that can be traced over time. 
 
5.  MODELING AND ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
 
Estimation of the effects of credit guarantees on SMEs proceeds in three steps. First, it is 
analyzed by identifying what determines the amount of credit guarantee. Second, the effect of 
credit guarantee on business failure is estimated for the firms which received credit guarantee. 
                                            
11 Credit Guarantee Identification (CGI) is 1 if a firm receives credit guarantee from KCGF, 2 if a firm receives 
credit guarantee from KOTEC, and 3 from both. KSIC (Korean Standard Identification Classification) is two digits. 
When location is considered, firms are divided into 5 categories. Seoul, Gyunggi, Inchon constitute first, Gangwon is 
second, Daejeon, Chungnam, and Chungbuk are third, fourth is consist of Busan, Daegu, Ulsan, Gyungnam, and 
Gyungbuk, Gwangju, Jeonnam, and Jeonbuk are fifth regions. 
  9Finally, the causal relationship between credit guarantee and performance of SMEs is 
investigated conditional on receipt of credit guarantee and survival.   
For the analysis of factors determining the amount of credit guarantee in the first part, in log 
form lacg, a simple relation accounting for various cohorts and time effects is specified as 
follows and estimated by ordinary least squares method (OLS): 
 
(2)   
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where fcg is a frequency of credit guarantee,   is a vector of dummy variable identifying 
which credit guarantee institution provided guarantees,    is a vector of location dummy 
variables,   is a vector of dummy variables of industrial sectors, and finally   is a 










This equation considers the relationship between the amount of credit guarantee and features 
of firms in various aspects. It includes not only financial data but also non-financial data such as 
age, size, location, possession of patents, period of application and industrial sector in which 
firms belong to. In case of financial data, fixed assets and sales are introduced since they are 
used as objective standards.
13 Thereafter, new dummy variable, KOSDAQ from KCGF and 
technology from KOTEC, are introduced instead of dummy variables which indicate type of 
guarantees. The reason is that in KOTEC, technology takes more weight in evaluation of 
applications and there is special guarantee offered which is based on technology evaluation only. 
To balance with KOTEC, KOSDAQ dummy is introduced for KCGF as a counterpart of 
technology based guarantee.
14  With this variable, it is possible to analyze indirectly the effect of 
capital market on provision of credit guarantees. 
For the analysis of business failure in the second part, discrete choice model, Logit or Probit, 
is popular model specifications. However, Tobit is introduced in this study since the explained 
                                            
12 The value of financial variables is transformed into constant 2004 prices using yield of treasury-bond (3 years). 
For the reasons of simplification of the notation, the firm (f) and time (t) subscripts are omitted.   
13 Sales usually display status of firms and fixed assets are used as collaterals. 
14 Korea Securities Dealers association Automated Quotation (KOSDAQ) is an alternative sources of finance for 
SMEs which cannot obtain finance from Korea Securities Exchange (KSE). It is an electronic trading system 
benchmarking NASDAQ in U.S.   
  10variable of survival in business is continuous in the interval between 0 and 1 after the data is 
transformed into a pseudo panel and a number of cells the survival share is 0. The model here is 
estimated by maximum likelihood method. The value reflects the share of firms in a cell which 
has survived. Here the estimated amount of credit guarantee is included in the set of regressors 
to analyze the effect of credit guarantee on survival as follows:   
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where    is the ratio of predicted amount of credit guarantee to total assets, fpt is fixed asset 
per total assets, spe is log of sales per employees, ope is log of operation income per employees, 
and ipt is the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. In this step, for financial variables, ratio 
variables are introduced to evade endogenous problem since credit guarantee amounts are 
predicted with other financial values. Other explanatory variables are the same as those of part 1 
related to credit receipt analysis. 
tp c aˆ
In the third part, three performance models are specified and estimated. Here performance of 
SMEs is evaluated with regards to three aspects; growth of sales, increase of employment, and 
productivity growth. The model specification is shown below and the estimation method is 
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where   is the log of predicted credit guarantee amounts, and the dependent variable 
performance is measured as growth of sales, increase of employment and productivity growth. 
The other explanatory variables are explained in above.
cg a lˆ
15 In each of the models described 
above we control for unobservable cohorts (firm) and time effects. The estimation methods used 
is corresponding to a fixed effect model in panel data analysis. 
 
                                            
15 Again in order to simplify the notation the cohort (firm) and time subscripts are excluded. The data is an 
unbalanced panel data. 
  116.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULT 
6.1. Descriptive  analysis 
 
The SMEs guaranteed by the two credit guarantee funds are different in characteristics from 
each other (Table 1). The SMEs guaranteed by KOTEC shows technology-based features: more 
firms have patents, and the average intangible assets are more than twice of their counterparts. 
Though they have more probability of business failure, they hire more employees. Their 
operating income and net income are also higher. On the other hand, SMEs guaranteed by 
KCGF are older and equities and sales are higher than those guaranteed by KOTEC. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of guaranteed firms 
 
Unit: Year, %, Hundred Million Won   
KCGF KOTEC  Total 
 
Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std 
Original  5.81 5.20 5.63 5.26 5.77 5.21 
Age 
Pseudo  8.67 6.41 7.47 5.72 8.12 6.29 
Original  13.59 41.78 21.82 38.34 15.43 41.18  Number of 
employees  Pseudo  76.89  232.55 59.27 91.98 72.20  199.27 
Original  275 677 378 954 298 749  Amount of 
guarantees  Pseudo  862  1,376 765  1,362 843  1443 
Original  0.08 0.27 0.15 0.35 0.09 0.29  Business 
failure  Pseudo 0.08  0.16  0.11  0.20  0.09  0.18 
Original  0.07 0.25 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.32 
Patent 
Pseudo  0.17 0.27 0.33 0.35 0.23 0.31 
Original  2,636  343,219 2,573 8,184 2,622  302,602 
Total assets 
Pseudo 14,008  115,745  7,474  18,498  11,879  95,564 
Original  46.49  7817.14 94.23  492.69 57.13  6895.46  Intangible 
assets  Pseudo  209.34  1399.56 174.37 610.96 196.90  1191.73 
Original  1,272  50,833 1,701 5,728 1,368  44,895 
Total liabilities 
Pseudo 9,370  85,517  5,007  13,436  7,911  70,602 
Original 1,364  293,556  872  3,068  1,255  258,782 
Total equities 
Pseudo  4,638  31,236 2,467 5,898 3,968  25,856 
Original  4,235  341,658 3,761  10,636 4,130  301,245 
Sales 
Pseudo 16,065  75,770  9,379  18,662  13,717  63,133 
Original 33  38,056  150  769  59  33,552  Operating 
income  Pseudo  818  6,910 458  1,234 690  5,704 
Original  48  13,128 65  943 52  11,582 
Net income 
Pseudo  298  2,911 128  3,124 216  3,311 
Note: Number of original firms is 200,702 and that of pseudo is 4014. 
 
  12However, distribution characteristics of some variables are reversed in pseudo panel data 
compared to the genuine observations. It should be noted that big difference in the size of cells 
leads to distortion in the process of transformation of the repeated cross sectional data into 
pseudo data. This is the reason for adjustment by using a weighting factor corresponding to the 
cell size.
16 Thus, the use of pseudo panel data is associated with both positive and negative 
effects. The main advantage in the current case is the ability to take into account for the fact that 
observations are not independent over time and pseudo panel data is the only viable alternative 
to overcome the problems resulting from absent of firm identity number. 
 
6.2.  Analysis of factors determining the amount of credit guarantee 
 
Results based on equation (2) show that in general, the smaller and younger firms were the 
applicants, the more credit guarantees they received.
17 This result (Table 2) coincides with the 
expectation that credit guarantees are preferentially distributed to the new entrants or growing 
firms. It is consistent with objectives of the guarantee system as well. Firms with more fixed 
assets and sales received more credit guarantee since fixed assets can be used as collateral and 
sales are standard of measures of evaluation of firm management. Significant estimate of the 
frequency of provision of credit reveals that credit guarantee institutions prefer the applicants 
with good records from the past to new entrants. Since credit guarantee funds heavily depend on 
continued contribution from government, they are under constant pressure to reduce their 
dependency on the public by being effective in operation. Therefore, there is an incentive to 
select previously approved applicants, even though they are on decline, rather than proving 
guarantee to new applicants with insufficient background information. This shows that there is 
conflict between incentives and goals in the credit guarantee institutions.   
In addition, the firms in Seoul, Inchon, and Gyunggi regions received more than those in 
other areas. It conflicts with government policy for seeking for regionally balanced development 
of the country. In case of industry classification, credit guarantees distributed to firms in 
construction more than in other sectors since construction depends more on domestic market 
suffering depression especially. However, keeping pace with economic recovery, the amount of 
credit guarantees decreased with the elapse of time. 
Technology dummy shows that lenders consider technology as important standard and 
preference is given to technology-based firms in evaluation of applications. However, lenders 
are cautious in evaluation of technology. Even though firms with patents received more credit 
                                            
16  To prevent distortion, squared root of cell size is used as weighting factor. 
17 The size of firms is determined according to number of employees. 
  13guarantee, firms with more intangible assets received less guarantees since lenders are 
conservative to recognize it as an asset and security for credit provisions.
18 
 
Table 2. LS parameter estimate of determinants of amount of credit guarantee (equation 2) 
 
Parameter Variable  definition    Total 
Age  Age of firms  -0.016a (0.002) 
Employee  The number of employees -0.161a  (0.013) 
Guarantee frequency  The number of receiving guarantee   0.030a  (0.003) 
Fixed Assets  Fixed Assets    0.458a (0.014) 
Sales Sales    0.280a  (0.014) 
Dummy location2  Gangwon  -0.263a (0.047) 
Dummy location3  Chungcheong  -0.158a (0.037) 
Dummy location4  Gyungsang  -0.074b (0.034) 
Dummy location5  Jeonla  -0.158a (0.038) 
Dummy t2  2002  -0.034 (0.033) 
Dummy t3  2003  -0.137a (0.033) 
Dummy t4  2004  -0.241a (0.034) 
Dummy KSIC2  Manufacturing    0.281a (0.094) 
Dummy KSIC3  Construction    0.675a (0.106) 
Dummy KSIC4  Wholesale and Retail trade    0.248b (0.104) 
Dummy KSIC5  Business activities      0.365a (0.101) 
Dummy KSIC6  Others  0.063 (0.096) 
Dummy KOSDAQ  Whether on KOSDAQ or not    0.088a (0.033) 
Dummy tech  Technology evaluation    0.052b (0.026) 
Adjust R square    0.720 
Note1: less than 1% is (a), 5% is (b), and 10% is (c) levels of significance. Value in parenthesis is STD.   
Note2: References for Dummy location are Seoul, Gyunggi, and Inchon. 
Note3: Reference for Dummy KSIC are mining and quarrying. 
 
On the other hand, the significantly positive coefficient of KOSDAQ dummy indicates that 
credit guarantees were distributed to inferior applicants failing to finance their investment needs 
from market sources in accordance to the policy goals to speed up recovery from the deep 
depression after the economic crisis. 
 
                                            
18  Development cost is recognized as an asset account in accordance with audit. 
  146.3.  The effects of credit guarantees on survival     
 
Collapse of venture bubble was severe survival trial to SMEs, especially to technology-
based firms. The depression of venture capital made SMEs to heavily depend more on public 
credit system. Actually, credit guarantee was the only viable financial source for technology-
based firms after the collapse of venture bubble in 2001. Analysis here is based on the result 
from estimation of the survival model (equation 3). Results in Table 3 show that, as a result, 
provision of credit guarantee shows expectable effects by increasing survival of firms. The 
ratio of credit guarantee amounts to total assets is positively correlated with survival and 
repetition of guarantee restrains bankruptcy. It has no effect on bankruptcy which credit 
guarantee institution provide guarantees, however, overlapping guarantee from both funds is 
negatively correlated with survival rate. It indicates that there was plethora in credit provision 
and even unqualified firms were benefited from excessive guarantee provision.
19 This 
disturbed the process of screening competitive firms from incompetent firms. Consequently, 
the number of frail firms increased and became more vulnerable to financial shocks.   
Similar to previous empirical researches (such as those of Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes, 
1995; Bartelsman, Scarpetta and Schivardi, 2003), age and size of firms show negative 
correlation with business failure. However, in case of age, the tendency of survival diminishes. 
Liquidity in assets is significant in that ratio of fixed assets to total assets is negatively 
correlated with survival of firms. Operation incomes per employees are positively correlated 
with survival while sales per employees are negative. It showed that many firm continued 
business with no or low margins, and finally went bankruptcy. Bankruptcy rate was high after 
collapse of bubble of venture business in 2001. However, survival rate increases with the 
elapse of time during the economic recovery.   
Survival rate is different across industries and regional locations. High bankruptcy in 
manufacturing is correlated with diminution in exports. The firms in construction dependent on 
domestic market are facing higher risk as those are under the influence of domestic market 
depression. It is politically questionable that survival rate is higher in Gangwon, Chungcheong, 
Jeonla, and Gyungsang than in Seoul, Gyunggi, and Inchon. It justifies government policy for 
a regionally balanced economic development. 
 
                                            
19  The balance of guarantee was corresponding to 6.1% of GDP in 2003. In 2005, IMF suggested a reduction in the 
balance by 1% annually in the next 5 years. 
  15Table 3. Parameter estimate of survival in Tobit regression (equation 3) 
 
Parameter Variable  definition    Total 
Age  Age of firms  0.024a (0.004) 
Age2  Squared age  -0.001a (0.001) 
Employee  The number of employees  0.054a (0.009) 
Guarantee frequency  The number of receiving guarantee  0.026a (0.006) 
CGA  Guarantee amounts / Total assets  0.222a (0.062) 
FPA  Fixed assets / Total assets  -0.079b (0.038) 
Productivity  Sales / Employees  -0.027a (0.008) 
OIPA  Operation Incomes / Employees  0.007c (0.004) 
Technology intensity  Intangible assets / Employees  -0.051 (0.109) 
Dummy patent  Existence of patents  -0.074a (0.017) 
Dummy location2  Gangwon  0.051b (0.024) 
Dummy location3  Chungcheong  0.062a (0.019) 
Dummy location4  Gyungsang  0.040b (0.017) 
Dummy location5  Jeonla  0.037c (0.019) 
Dummy t2  2002  -0.005 (0.015) 
Dummy t3  2003  0.103a (0.016) 
Dummy t4  2004  0.314a (0.018) 
Dummy KSIC2  Manufacturing  -0.157a (0.053) 
Dummy KSIC3  Construction  -0.121b (0.060) 
Dummy KSIC4  Wholesale and Retail trade  -0.096c (0.057) 
Dummy KSIC5  Business activities  -0.102c (0.057) 
Dummy KSIC6  Others  -0.082 (0.054) 
Dummy com2  Guaranteed by KOTEC  -0.011 (0.024) 
Dummy com3  % by KCGF is more than 50%  -0.095a (0.026) 
Dummy com4  % by KCGF is less than 50%  -0.124a (0.029) 
Dummy KOSDAQ  Whether on KOSDAQ or not  -0.029c (0.017) 
Dummy tech  Technology evaluation  0.007 (0.023) 
Log likelihood    -1486 
Note1: less than 1% is (a), 5% is (b), and 10% is (c) levels of significance. Value in parenthesis is STD.   
Note2: References for Dummy location are Seoul, Gyunggi, and Inchon. 
Note3: Reference for Dummy KSIC are mining and quarrying. 
 
While technology dummy variable is insignificant, KOSDAQ dummy is significantly 
negative. It showed that the firms which failed to raise finance from the market were facing 
severe difficulties to survive even though they were supported by credit guarantee funds. The 
coefficient of patent dummy is negative and it reflects that technology-based firms are exposed 
  16to a more competitive environment. Therefore, a more professional evaluation system is 
indispensable in evaluation of technology-based firms. 
 
6.4.  The impact of credit guarantee on performance of SMEs 
 
Performance of SMEs based on model in equation (4) is evaluated with regards to three 
aspects: increase of employment, growth of sales, and improvement in labor productivity. The 
results are reported in Table 4. In each case, the effect of credit guarantee shows similar 
conflicting tendencies. The amounts of credit guarantees increase both sales and productivity.
20 
On the contrary, repetitions of credit guarantees fail to reinforce growth.   
These conflicting results indicate that a balanced fund operation is necessary to attain 
effective distribution of financial resources. Appropriate guarantee helps SMEs to restore 
business activities at a lower social cost. However, a lenient distribution of credit guarantees 
procrastinate withdrawal of inefficient firms and deprived new applicants of opportunity. In 
early 2000’s, not only micro businesses but also relatively large firms on the KOSDAQ were 
guaranteed as well and it is contrary to its original goal to support SMEs suffering from 
insufficient finances due to asymmetric information system. As expected, the performance of 
firms on the KOSDAQ is disappointing. Consequently, it results in inefficient allocation of 
public resources. If selective guarantees had proceeded, effect of credit guarantee would have 
been maximized. On the other hand, the effect to employment, one of the most important factors 
to guarantee SMEs, is obscured in all cases. Since late 1990’s, firms have reduced cost, 
including personnel cost, to escape from depression by restructuring measures. Therefore, 
preservation of employment was expected with credit guarantees. However, regression results in 
this regard are statistically insignificant.   
Firm specific factors like size and age have effects on the growth of sales, employment and 
labor productivity. Larger firms are superior to smaller ones in performance generally even 
though labor productivity is lower in larger firm due to faster increment of employment 
compared with that of their sales. The gap between LSEs and SMEs originates in R&D 
investment. Only LSEs to some degree could accumulate potential capability by R&D 
investment to take advantage of the opportunity during the post economic crisis recovery period. 
Kiyota and Okazaki (2005) indicate that firms with acquired technologies achieved much faster 
growth in performance in Japanese case. Nevertheless, policy-funds might be used for 
                                            
20 To avoid the endogeneity problem, the predicted credit guarantee amounts obtained from equation 2 is introduced 
observed credit guarantee amounts. 
  17adjustment of declining industries rather than for supporting technology acquisition as they refer 
to JDB loans (loans from Development Bank of Japan).
21  
 
Table 4. LS estimates of effect of credit guarantee on performances (equation 4). 
 
   Dependent  variables 




Growth of labor 
productivity 
Age  Age of firms  -0.005 (0.004)  -0.003c 
(0.002)  -0.003 (0.003) 
Guarantee 
frequency 
The number of receiving 
guarantee  -0.009c (0.006)  0.001 (0.003)  -0.008c (0.005) 
Guarantee amount  Predicted guarantee 
amounts  0.385a (0.032)  -0.021 (0.017)  0.319a (0.025) 
Intangible assets  Log of intangible assets  -0.017c (0.009)  0.001 (0.005)  -0.012c (0.007) 
Dummy size2  Medium size  0.446a (0.089)  0.416a (0.048)  -0.133c (0.071) 
Dummy size3  Large size  0.448a (0.091)  0.560a (0.049)  -0.270a (0.072) 
Dummy location2  Gangwon  0.553a (0.079)  0.117a (0.043)  0.423a (0.062) 
Dummy location3  Chungcheong  0.292a (0.059)  0.033 (0.032)  0.234a (0.047) 
Dummy location4  Gyungsang  0.076 (0.054)  0.006 (0.029)  0.047 (0.043) 
Dummy location5  Jeonla  0.383a (0.063)  0.047 (0.034)  0.290a (0.050) 
Dummy time2  2003  0.128a (0.045)  0.014 (0.025)  0.097a (0.036) 
Dummy time3  2004  0.124a (0.047)  0.027 (0.026)  0.060c (0.038) 
Dummy KSIC2  Manufacturing  -0.163 (0.149)  -0.006 (0.081)  -0.233b (0.118) 
Dummy KSIC3  Construction  -0.512a (0.169)  -0.023 (0.092)  -0.517a (0.135) 
Dummy KSIC4  Wholesale and Retail trade  -0.123 (0.169)  0.207b (0.091)  -0.432a (0.134) 
Dummy KSIC5  Business activities  0.306b (0.160)  0.045 (0.087)  0.156 (0.127) 
Dummy KSIC6  Others  0.242 (0.153)  0.162b (0.083)  0.070 (0.121) 
Dummy company2  Guaranteed by KOTEC  0.129c (0.078)  -0.012 (0.042)  0.107c (0.062) 
Dummy company3  % by KCGF is more than 
50%  -0.010 (0.084)  -0.068 (0.045)  0.011 (0.067) 
Dummy company4  % by KCGF is less than 
50%  0.003 (0.107)  -0.059 (0.058)  0.020 (0.085) 
Dummy KOSDAQ  Whether on KOSDAQ or 
not  -0.163a (0.057)  0.010 (0.031)  -0.126a (0.045) 
Dummy tech  Whether on technology 
evaluation  -0.143b (0.075)  -0.016 (0.041)  -0.086 (0.060) 
Adjust R square    0.082  0.062    0.063 
Note1: less than 1% is (a), 5% is (b), and 10% is (c) levels of significance. Value in parenthesis is STD.   
Note2: References for Dummy location are Seoul, Gyunggi, and Inchon   
Note3: Reference for Dummy KSIC are mining and quarrying. 
                                            
21  Kiyota and Okazaki consider JDB loans as one of the policy tools. 
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Intangible assets show that investment in technology failed to show desired outcomes in 
short-terms. This phenomenon is caused by specific characteristics such as time lag in 
commercialization of technology. While many SMEs could not preserve short-term financial 
crisis in the unfavorable circumstances, Chinese products based on low or medium level 
technology encroached on market. To cope with the resulted hardships,  firms have tried to 
increase competitiveness through severe reconstruction programs. As a result, age has negative 
relation with growth of employment. 
To analyze industrial effects, both domestic and foreign relations should be considered. As 
mentioned above, low priced products from China have stricken SMEs in manufacturing sector. 
LSEs purchase Chinese component or material to reduce cost and they have encroached on 
market in large extent. On the other hand, depression in construction originates in depression of 
domestic market. Contrarily, business activities grew with business invigoration policy. 
Performances are better in less industrialized areas such as Gangwon, Chungcheong, and Jeonla 
than in urban areas such as Seoul, Inchon, and Gyunggi. In the same way as in the case of 
survival analysis, the performance results support government policy targeting a balanced 
development of lands. 
The growth of sales of SMEs guaranteed by KOTEC is less than those by KCGF. This 
might be related with the fact that there was the collapse of bubble in venture business in the 
early 2000’s. It is intrinsically risky to guarantee technology based-firms based on only 
evaluation of technology factors. Providers of loans in the private sector are so conservative in 
recognizing value of technology that many technology-based firms have difficulties to obtain 
sufficient finances from the market. Therefore, more elaborated process is needed in the 
evaluation of technology firms. 
 
7. SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, the impact of credit guarantees on survival and performance of SMEs in Korea 
is analyzed at the firm level covering the economic recovery period of post the economic crisis. 
To measure the effect of credit guarantees, the relationship between credit guarantee, survival, 
and productive performance of firms is analyzed. The amount and frequency of credit guarantee 
provisions have effects on survival and growth of SMEs respectively. The ratio of credit 
guarantee amounts to total assets is positively correlated with survival and repetition of 
guarantee restrains firm bankruptcy. Credit guarantee amounts contribute to the growth of sales 
  19and productivity while repeated receipts of credit guarantees are negatively correlated with sales. 
On the other hand, the performance of credit guarantee is obscured in growth of employment. If 
credit guarantees are distributed not only to competitive firms but also to inefficient enterprises, 
debtors lose incentive to innovate to improve their competitive power. Actually, repetition is not 
significantly related to the growth of employment. It reassures that credit guarantee should be 
deployed carefully so that it best contributes to achievement of the policy targets. The difference 
in growth of sales and productivity between SMEs guaranteed by KCGF and those by KOTEC 
indicated that evaluation of technology is difficult and the technology evaluation system in the 
past has not been well reflected in the credit evaluation procedure.   
As revealed in other studies, size and age play a decisive role in survival and employment 
rates. Large and experienced firms show a higher survival rate than their small and younger 
counterparts. Since firms have tried to recover their competitive power by restructuring, 
employment has negative relationship with age. The polarized performances between SMEs and 
LSEs are attributed to the fact that LSEs accumulated growth potential by investment into R&D 
and innovative restructuring while SMEs suffered from shortage of sources to finance 
investment and as a result lost their competitiveness consequently. 
Survival and performance of firms differs over time, and across industries, and locations. 
The collapse of bubble in the venture business deteriorated the economic situation in the early 
2000’s. As a result, business failure rate and unemployment were high. Generally, Firms in 
construction are unsuccessful under the influence of domestic market depression. Despite lower 
amount of guarantee, firms in Gangwon and Chungcheong show a high survival rate and growth 
of sales compared with firms located in Seoul, Gyunggi, and Inchon. This result is in favor of 
government policy which aimed at balancing the economic development at the aggregate 
national level. Therefore, distribution of credit guarantee should be aligned with politics 
targeting to balance the development at the national wide.   
Although this study generates interesting results in that it is the first attempt to analyze the 
effects of credit guarantee on SMEs at the firm level, there are some limitations. Owing to limits 
in the data collection, this study is based on pseudo panel data instead of real data. Inevitably, 
partial loss or distortion in information might occur in the process of data transformation. 
Impossibility in the identification of individual observations prevents comparison between 
guaranteed firms and no-guaranteed firms. Moreover, the relatively short observation period is 
not sufficient to include the long run effects of economic crisis in late 1990’s. Therefore, it is 
necessary to supplement these limitations in future data collections or alternatively merge these 
data sources with available register data. 
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  22APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. Summary of literature review 
Author        Year  Period Method Country Result 
Agarwal        1996  1906- Hazard  model U.S
While entering firms have a higher probability of survival  in stages of high 
technological activity, the hazard function is higher for technical products reflecting 
the adverse effects of technical uncertainty and obsolescence of incumbent 
knowledge 
Audretsch 
et al  1999        1987-1993 Tobit  regression Italy The growth rates are negatively and significantly correlated with initial size while 
there is no evidence to link star-up size with survival.   
Audretsch   1991  1976-1986  Logit  regression  U.S. 
The new-firm survival is promoted by the extent of innovative activity. The 
existence of substantial scale economies and a high capital-labor ratio tends to lower 
the likelihood of firm survival. 
Bartelsman 
et al  2003    1989-1994 Fixed effect regression/ 
Hazard model  OECD 
The average size of incumbents varies widely across sectors and countries. Entry and 
exit rates are highly correlated across industries. Firm turnover depends on market 
characteristics but also regulations and institutions.     
Dhawan        2001  1970-1989 OLS U.S. Small firms are significantly more productive but also more risky than large 
counterparts 
Heshmati      2001 1993-1998 Probit, Pooled OLS, GLS  Sweden 
The relationship between the growth, size, and age of firm is very sensitive with 
respect to the method of estimation, functional form, and definition of growth and 
size of firms. 
Honjo      2000  1986-1994  Hazard  model Japan The new firm that entered just before or after the collapse of the so-called bubble 
economy has been more likely to fail. 
Jovanovic  1982    Noisy selection model    Within an industry, smaller firms grow faster and are more likely to fail than large 
firms. Firms learn about their efficiency as they operate in the industry. 
Lee      2003  1984-2000  Hazard  model Korea The larger is the size of firm, the lower is the risk of firm exit. Type of market entry 
affects post-entry performance of individual firm 
Mata et al    1995  1982-1990      Hazard  model Portugal
Size is an important determinant of the chances of survival. Current size is better 
predictor of failure than initial size. New plants are more likely to live longer if they 
enter growing industries or industries with little entry activity. 
Stern et al  1995  1979-1991  Logit regression  U.S. 
Survival chances are associated with strategy and location. There are specific 
instances where survival chances of new firm appear to be modified by industry and 
location.  
Taymaz    1997  1985-1992
Descriptive analysis/ 
Stochastic frontier analysis/ 
Hazard model 
Turkey 
SMEs seem to be less productive and profitable than LSEs. The net contribution of 
new firms to employment generation is quite substantial. The survival rate is 
considerably lower for SMEs. Survival probability of plant depends on its initial 
size, the level of concentration in market, entry rate, and the degree of market 
fluctuation. 
Wilbon        2002 -1992  Logit  regression U.S. Effective management of technology processes may contribute to long-term survival 
of small- to medium-sized high technology enterprises 
 
  23Appendix 2. Necessary condition for a firm to be classified as a SME 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration 
SMEs  Micro 
Enterprises  Industry 




No. of regular 
employees 
Manufacturing  Less than 300  8 billion won or less  Less than 50 
Mining, Construction,   
Transportation  Less than 300  3 billion won or less  Less than 50 
Large-scale wholesaler, 
Hotels, Information processing  Less than 300  30 billion won or less  Less than 10 
Seedling, Broadcasting,   
Fishery-related fuels 
or relevant products 
Less than 200  20 billion won or less 
(Sales)  Less than 10 




Business assistance services, 
Entertainment services, 
News provider 
Less than 100  10 billion won or less 
(Sales)  Less than 10 
Others Less  than  300  5 billion won or less 
(sales)  Less than 10 
 






































































Source: Small and Medium Business Administration 
  24Appendix 4. Employees in SMEs 
(Unit: 1,000, %) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
SMEs Employees (A)  8,260 7,660 8,870 9,680 9,970  10,390 
Total Employees (B)  11,100 10,180 10,830 11,530 11,650 11,980 
Ratio (A/B)  74.4 75.3 81.9 83.9 85.6 86.7 
Source: Small and Medium Business Administration 
 
Appendix 5. Comparison between LSEs and SMEs in manufacturing 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
LSEs  1.97 6.58  16.68 0.84 7.21 6.55  Sales growth 
rate  SMEs -  2.01 10.79 12.45  3.38 10.21  5.39 
LSEs  2.02 1.77 1.47 1.52 1.72 2.02  R&D expense/   
Sales  SMEs 0.62 0.47 0.71 0.99 0.85 0.78 
LSEs  6.53 7.38 8.21 6.03 7.54 8.16  Operating 
income margin  SMEs 5.15 5.23 5.83 4.54 5.29 4.64 
LSEs -6.08  -1.26  -4.34 -0.7 8.37 4.84  Net income 
Margin  SMEs  -0.45 2.37  2.6 1.37 2.48 2.08 
LSEs  295.38 208.94 224.59 201.63 128.88 113.49  Debt to equity 
Ratio  SMEs 334.37 232.38 179.71 144.74 152.08 147.57 
LSEs  62.2  86.88 146.05 121.07 255.42 428.83  Interest 
coverage ratio  SMEs  92.65 132.63 198.46 175.56  273.7 255.93 

































Figure 1. Development of export over time by size class of firms 
Source: Small Business Corporation 
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Figure 2. Output weighted total factor productivity (TFP) levels in manufacturing sector 
Source: Oh, Heshmati, Baek and Lee (2005), “Comparative analysis of firm dynamics between large enterprises and 
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Figure 3. Output weighted TFP growth rate in manufacturing sector 
Source: Oh, Heshmati, Baek and Lee (2005), “Comparative analysis of firm dynamics between large enterprises and 
small and medium sized enterprises in the Korean manufacturing industry (1993-2002)”, TEP Discussion Paper 
2005:1. 
 
Appendix 6. Amounts of credit guarantee by technology evaluation in KOTEC 
 
(Unit: Billion won, %) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 
The amount of guarantee by 
technology evaluation (A)  601 1,006 1,251 2,048 
Total guarantee amount (B)  16,160  16,523  16,746  13,472 
Ratio (A/B)  3.7  6.1  7.5  15.2 
Source: KOTEC 
 
Appendix 7. Credit guarantee amount 
 
(Unit: Billion Won) 
Source: KCGF and KOTEC
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
KCGF  11,329 21,454 19,621 22,592 31,268 32,514 32,734 
KOTEC  5,724 11,340 11,306 12,498 16,161 16,523 16,746 
Total  17,053 32,794 30,927 35,090 47,429 49,037 49,480 
  27Appendix 8. Fund assets, Government investment, and Subrogation 
 
    (Unit:  Billion  Won) 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
KCGF  705 2,117 2,602 2,892 3,458 3,507 3,370 
KOTEC  327 1,190 1,243 1,426 1,393 1,582 1,044  Fund Assets 
Total  1,032 3,307 3,845 4,318 4,851 5,089 4,414 
KCGF  400 2,881 1,001  510 1,223  525  656 
KOTEC  200  1,503 426 270 277 315 294  Government 
Investment 
Total  600 4,384 1,427  780 1,500  840  950 
KCGF  736  2,011  1,119 815 888 839  1,742 
KOTEC  435  1,008 740 377 724 497 960  Subrogation 
Total  1,171 3,019 1,859 1,192 1,612 1,336 2,702 
Source: KCGF and KOTEC 
 
Appendix 9. Number of firms in over time 
 
2001 2002 2003 2004 
Year 




















































Note: Figures in parenthesis mean percentage share. 
 
Appendix 10. Number of firms by size 
 
Small Medium Large 
Size 








































Note: Figures in parenthesis mean percentage share. 
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Manufacturing    Construction
Wholesale and 
Retail trade 
Business activities  The others 
KSIC 












































































Note: Figures in parenthesis mean percentage share. 
 
Appendix 12. Distribution of firms by location, type of data and funds 
 
Gyunggi          Gangwon Chungcheong Gyungsang Jeonla
Location 
































































Note: Figures in parenthesis mean percentage share. 
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